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Inherent safety is an important term for development of safety performance 
indicator. Inherent safety principles are used in order to calculate the safety performance 
indicator for selected based case. The safety performance indicator has been developed 
from the traditional approach to the new strategies and tools. In this project, the aim is to 
develop an inherently safety model by considering the conflicts or tradeoffs that will be 
arose when a process unit is attempt to apply Inherent Safety Principles. The focus will 
be narrowed down on analyzing the risk of toxic release. The risk will be calculated by 
implementing one of available tools for inherent safety. The method that will be used in 
this project will be similar to the available tools. However, the calculated risk is 
corresponding to the damage index and the conflict indices which will be developed 
throughout the project. Thus, conflict index, CI has been developed in taken into 
accounts the likelihood of conflicts that arise in the design options after considering the 
inherent safety principles (ISP) which is the measurement of the impact of the ISP 
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Several established qualitative hazard analysis such as safety reviews, checklist and 
HAZOP has been used widely during design stage (CCPS, 1992). Although this 
approach is very efficient and useful, it is believed that inherent safety approach could 
be better technique. Inherent safer design approach is to eliminate or reduce the hazard 
by changing the process itself, rather than by adding on additional safety devices and 
layers of protection (Hendershot. D.C., 1999). Ideally, hazard would be reduced to a 
level where no protective systems are required because the hazard is too small to be of 
concern. Even it is not possible, an inherently safer process will allow the number of 
layers of protection to be reduced. The overall design is therefore more robust from a 
safety and environmental viewpoint, and is likely to be less expensive to build and 
operate because of the elimination of complex system.  
 
Inherent safety principles are accomplished throughout the design process stage, 
from the conception until completion. The four main concepts of inherently safer design 
are intensification/minimization (to reduce the amount of hazardous material involved in 
the process as much as possible), attenuation/moderation (to challenge process 
conditions such as that it renders the substance/process less hazardous), substitution (to 
use a less hazardous material compared to a more hazardous one) and simplification (to 
reduce unnecessary complexity and opportunities of human errors). If implemented 
properly, inherently safer design can achieve higher reduction benefits compared to 
procedural safety systems (Hendershot, 1997). Inherent Safety Design also has been 
considered as an inspiring philosophy which could be the bases of sustainability. 
Despite, these principles will help in reducing hazard by using safer material and 
operating conditions, minimizing inventory and by designing a simpler and friendlier 
plant (Palaniappan et al., 2002).  
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It has been highlighted that the inherent safety concept using technologies and 
chemical that reduce or eliminate the possibility of an accident. However, in spite of 
having such advantages, the previous method in inherent safety principles has been 
limited. Nevertheless, the lacks of recognized methodology or tools to analyze the 
inherently safer design at the early stage of process design by including the conflict and 
tradeoffs that arise to process alternatives are the crucial obstacles to the implementation 
of this safety philosophy. Lack of studies in tradeoffs that may arise in the system has 
questioned the sustainability and persistency of the selected methods. Thus, there is a 
need to incorporated safety considerations with the design procedure and apply methods 
with quantitative estimate the hazard. Process Safety Conflict Index (PSCI) will 
objectively define and analyzed the tradeoffs and calculated the risk. This integrated 
study of the risk relative to the base case is calculated and ranked.   
 
However, in this project, the focus will be narrowed down on analyzing the risk of 
toxic release. The risk will be calculated by implementing one of available tools for 
inherent safety. The method that will be used in this project will be similar to the 
available tools. However, the calculated risk is corresponding to the damage index and 
the conflict indices which will be developed throughout the project. In this context, these 
quantitative indices provide a good balance in analyzing the conflict that arises in the 
system and the risk calculated can be rank based on the developed conflict indices. 
Parallel to this, this method also aimed to be able to calculate the consequences of the 
base case and also to calculate the likelihood of the conflicts studies that arise in the 
system while implementing the inherent safety principles. This study also highlighted 
the integrated study of the risk relative to the base case and the risk will be ranked for 






Overall, objective of these inherent safety principles concepts into the design stage 
has been approached thoroughly. Finally, a case study of production of methyl 
methacrylate (MMA) was used to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed method 
Application of this work; not only to solvent the selection but also other material and 
parameter selection will be extremely beneficial in early conceptual design for greater 
impact of inherent safety.  
 
Throughout this report, there are four highlighted chapters that cover the 
introduction of the project, literature review of related topics and project methodology, 
results and discussion, and conclusion. The introduction part mainly discussed about the 
background of the study of the inherent safety and development of the tools, objectives 
of the projects and the scope of study. Chapter 2 of the report will be described more on 
the literature review of the inherent safety, the features and various developments from 
the early days of implementation.  The literature reviews will also be covered an 
accident that happened because of the toxic release. 
 
 Also described in this chapter is about the conflict or tradeoffs that will be analyzed 
and studied. In this part, the details project framework of the study is discussed. In order 
to determine the best main routes of producing methyl methacrylate (MMA) and ranked 
the routes in hypothetically safety order, Chapter 4 presents a comparison study in 
damage index and tradeoffs in each process routes. Finally, the recommendations will be 
discussed and a conclusion will be stated in this report together with the references used 








2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, it contains the literature reviews that taken from several source like 
journals, book and the internet. The literature reviews includes the critical analysis of the 
journals taken from various source. The information related to the inherent safety 
principles that will be apply in this project will be discussed in this chapter. These 
literature reviews are very important in order to develop the best tools for inherent safety 
assessment. 
 
2.1 Inherent Safety  
 
Risk reduction strategy is aimed at reducing frequency or mitigating the 
consequences of potential accidents. One of the strategies in reducing the risk is by 
applies Inherent Safety Principle in the process design. It is best to implement these 
principles at the early design stage of process design because their effectiveness in 
improving process safety can be assessed. (Takriff and Bahnuddin N.N., 2008; Khan 
and Amyotte, 2002, 2003). In the other hand, a chemical manufacturing process is 
described as inherently safer if it reduces or eliminates hazards associated with materials 
and operations used in the process, and this reduction or elimination is a permanent and 
inseparable part of the process technology.  
 
Inherent safety methodologies are generally regarded as being more reliable and 
robust because they depend on the physical and chemical properties of the system rather 
that the proper and timely operation. By considering the approaches such as designing 
equipment to withstand any reasonably expected explosion pressure to be an example of 




2.2 Key Ideas of ISP 
 
Inherently safer design concepts include the following key ideas: 
a)  Hazard Elimination: 
a. Concept   
Eliminate hazards as a first priority (rather than accepting them and 
mitigating them as a risk reduction strategy once they exist) 
b. Potential Methods  
 Eliminate the hazardous material 
 Substitute a non-hazardous material 
 Discontinue the operation 
 
b) Consequence Reduction: 
a. Concept  
Hazards cannot be completely eliminated, find less hazardous solutions 
to accomplish the same design objective by focusing on the consequences 
b. Potential Methods  
 Reduce the quantity of the hazardous material 
 Provide a curbed area with a drain to contain and evacuate a spill 
and produce a smaller pool area of a spill 
 Separate the operation by adequate spacing to reduce exposure to 
adjacent operations and personnel 
 
c)  Likelihood Reduction: 
a. Concept  
Hazards cannot be completely eliminated and after consideration of 
consequence reduction, consider ways such to reduce the likelihood of 
events occurring; 
b. Potential Methods  
 Reduce the potential for human error through simplicity of design 
 Provide redundant alarms 
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2.2.1 Inherent Safety Principles 
 
The terminology of inherent safety varies throughout the process safety 
community. Table 1 (Khan and Amyotte , 2002) presents commonly used inherent 
safety principles or guidewords.  
 
Inherent safety strives to enhance process safety by introducing fundamentally 
safer characteristics into process design. Implementation of inherent safety means 
selecting and designing the process to eliminate hazards rather than accepting the hazard 
and implementing add-on system to control it.  
 
The opportunity for installing the inherent safety features decreases exponentially 
from conceptual design stage to operational stage. Thus it is best to implement the 
inherent safety at early stages of process design and to assess their effectiveness in 
improving in process safety.  
 
Table 1: Inherent Safety Principles (Khan and Amyotte, 2002) 
Inherent Safety Principle Definition 
Intensification Reduction in the quantify of hazardous materials 
Substitution Use of safer materials 
Attenuation Operation at comparably safer operating conditions  
Limitation of effects Changing the design and operation for less severe 
effects 







With this approach, the primary concepts may be summarized by four basic 
principles: minimize, substitute, moderate, and simply. These four building blocks of 
inherent safety are described below. 
 
 Minimize 
Use smaller quantities of hazardous substances. This may be achieved through efficient 
continuous reactors such as stirred tanks, loop reactors or tubular reactor in place of 
batch reactors. It will also reduce the inventory raw materials and in-process 
intermediates, and efficient process equipment.  
 Substitute 
Replace a material with a less hazardous substance. This could be achieved through 
water based paints and coatings, alternative chemistry using less hazardous materials, 
and less flammable or toxic solvents. Substitution of innovative chemistries offers the 
potential for inherent safer and more environmentally friendly process which include 
electrochemical techniques, series reactions, reaction controlled by microwaves and 
laser light, use of extremozymes and various innovative catalytic processes.  
 Moderate 
Use less hazardous conditions, a less hazardous form of a material, or facilities which 
minimize the impact of a release of hazardous material or energy. This could be 
implemented through dilution, refrigeration of volatile hazardous materials, and granular 
agricultural product formulations in place of powders.  
 Simplify 
Design facilities which eliminates unnecessary complexity and make operating errors 
less likely, and which are forgiving errors that are made. On the other hand, 
simplification sometimes involves a tradeoff between the complexity of an overall plant 
and complexity within one particular piece of equipment 
17 
 
2.3 The Need for Inherent Safety  
 
An approach safety is an afterthought in the design. A safety review or Process 
Hazards Analysis (PHA), such as a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) or a What 
if?/Checklist Study, merely as a project 'check' instead of a preemptive hazards 
reduction tool. If these studies are done at the latter stages of engineering or during 
construction, there is a natural tendency to avoid expensive redesign or rework. Inherent 
safety benefits are often missed.  
 
There may be several explanations for the claim that inherently safer design practices 
are not being used to their maximum advantage. These may include factors such as: 
a) The lack of standardized approaches to commonly applied process hazard analysis 
studies and a failure to include inherent safety in PHAs 
b) The lack of a recognized method for incorporating inherently safer design issues 
into the process safety management process or a discipline to review the merits of 
options for inherent safety 
c) The lack of safety experience and knowledge to apply these approaches 
d) Lack of clear measures of acceptability of risks, thus, teams do not have good rules 














2.4 Traditional Approaches to Manage Risk 
 
In early 1990s, there were already several existing evaluation methods for process 
safety such as Dow and HAZOP studies. Unfortunately, they were not directly suitable 
as analysis tools to be used in preliminary process design. Most of the methods required 
too detailed qualitative study of all process units, piping and instruments of any 
chemical process industries. HAZOP method identifies problems that may be caused if 
the operations do not occur as per design. This is not directly applicable such as for 
conceptual design. Likewise, FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) and FMEA (Failure Mode 
Effect Analysis) can be utilized to address different aspects of risk assessment. These 
methodologies require substantial input from high-quality technical expertise.  Also not 
all methods were suitable for computerized use with simulation and optimization tools. 
 
Hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies will provide information on how a 
particular accidents occur. The study will focus on determining the frequency of 
accident occurs. QRA or LOPA (the simplified QRA) studies show how the frequencies 
are used. In both methods, the frequency of the release is determined using a 
combination of event trees, fault trees or an appropriate adaptation. Thus in this context, 
quantitative indices provide a good balance between simplicity and sophistication. The 
virtues worth are: 
 
a) Quantitative analysis can be worked out quickly, provide a swift means of hazard 
identification 
b) Provide net scores which enable easy interpretation of results: one can just compare 
the net score with the designated risk levels.  
c) Net scores enable comparison of hazards posed by alternatives 





2.5 Development of Inherent Safety Approach 
 
Despite the various development efforts on inherent safety assessment in the early 
design stage that have been put forward by various investigators, minimal work has been 
carried out to integrate the assessment.  There are various inherent safety assessment 
techniques with different features and requirements throughout these several years. The 
earliest technique has been developed in early 1993 which is Prototype of Index of 
Inherent Safety (PIIS).  Khan and Amyotte (2000,2003) has also mentioned that the 
selected approaches or methods have been revised by numerous authors because of their 
systematic and easy to use tool that may answer most of the safety design questions. 
Nevertheless, most of the approaches are much similar to the well known and practiced 
HAZOP study procedure (Khan and Amyotte, 2005). 
 
2.5.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Available Methods 
 
Table 2: Comparison between Various Tools 
Available 
Tools 






Analyze the process 
routes. 
 Very reaction-step 
oriented and does 
not consider much 
other parts of the 
system such as 
separation 
sections.  

































































 Limited range of 
factors or choice 
of the materials 
and the sequence 
of steps. 
















 Consider safety, 
health and 
environmental 
factors in one 
set of tools. 
 Reduce layer of 
protection 
 
Wide range of tools of 
the particular interest 
to measure the 
inherent safety of 



















in process routes 
 
Does not account 
safety issues in related 
to the phase of 
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2.6 Design Conflicts and Trade-offs 
 
Design objectives are often in conflict, and may be mutually exclusive. The 
designer must choose which of the alternative solutions has the best overall balance of 
characteristics with respect to all of the design objectives. This is true in considering 
inherently safer processes. Ideally, it is the best to identify inherently safer process 
alternatives which simultaneously reduce or eliminate all of the potential hazards. 
Unfortunately, in the real world, this is seldom occurs. A process alternative which is 
safer with respect to one hazard may increase other hazards. Thus, a designer must 
identify and consider all of the hazards and apply appropriate decision making tools to 
identify the best overall solution.  
 
2.6.1 Bottleneck/ Limiting Factors of ISP 
 
The issues of the tradeoffs that arise when attempting to apply ISP are as below: 
 
a. Inherent Safety/ Performance 
Example: Paint A is inherently safer than Paint B, but may offer poor 
performance under certain conditions. 
b. Inherent Safety/ Environment 
Example: Refrigerant C is inherently safer than alternates such as ammonia, 
but are also recognize as environmentally deleterious to ozone.  
c. ISP/ISP 
Example: A process use relatively non-hazardous materials but may require 
high temperature and pressure.  
d. Hazard/Hazard 
Example: A solvent for exothermic reaction may be nonvolatile but 





2.7 Previous incidents related to Toxic Release 
 
2.7.1 Statistic of chemical accidents 
 
Below is the statistic of chemical accidents that frequently happened in United 
States based on research done by James C. Belke in 2000. Chlorine Dioxide is listed as 
the chemical that apparently mostly caused accidents per year (J.C. Belke, 2000) 
 
Table 3: Normalized Accident Rates for RMP Chemicals, 1994-1999 
Chemical Name Number of Accidents 





 Number of 
Accidents per Mlbs 





Chlorine Dioxide 0.155 1 1.97 2 
Hydrogen Sulfide 0.067 2 0.50 3 
Hydrogen Fluoride 0.064 3 0.27 4 
Hydrogen Chloride 0.060 4 0.25 5 
Titanium tetrachloride 0.056 5 0.090 9 













2.7.2 Toxic Release Accidents  
 
In some occurrences, lack of knowledge, technology or implementation of 
process safety has led to tragic incidents. The table below has shown the analysis of both 
incidents. 
Table 4: Accidents and Causes 
Incidents Type of Hazards Cause(s) 
 
Bhopal, India  
Year: 1984 
Description: 





Toxic cloud of methyl 
isocyanides (MIC) gas.  
 
Trigged by water-washing of 
lines. The water entered the 
system containing 42 tons of 
MIC. The resulting exothermic 
reaction increased the 
temperature inside the tank to 
over 200 °C (392 °F) and raised 
the pressure. The tank vented 







250 reported cases 
of chloracne 
 
Exposure of hazardous 
TTCD at high 
concentration, 10 ppm. 
However, in the higher-
temperature conditions 
associated with the 
runaway reaction, TCDD 
production apparently 
reached 100 ppm or more. 
The limit of the chemicals 
is only 1ppm.  
 
The exhaust steam temperature 
rising to around 300°C, heating 
the reactor wall above the level of 
the liquid to the same 
temperature. The residual heat in 
the jacket then heated the upper 
layer of the mixture next to the 
wall to the critical temperature. 
After seven hours a rapid 
runaway reaction ensued when 










3 METHODOLOGY/PROJECT WORK 
 
A new framework and a prototype tool were developed to allow enhanced safety 
features to be incorporated in safety design. The framework will assesses risk level 
associated with various options in a fast and efficient manner. This framework is aim to 
provide clear strategies to implement risk and consequences assessment studies at 
various design stages. The framework was then translated into a risk estimation tools to 
allow the immediate analysis of risk and consequences levels. 
 
Process Safety Conflicts Index (PSCI) is a new develop framework that aims at 
providing a concept that calculates conflicts or tradeoffs that arise after implementing 
Inherent Safety Principles to a desired process unit. It simultaneously integrates this 
PSCI information with safety measures as they ought to be. PSCI in quantified in a 
manner similar to toxic damage index (TDI) of the HIRA system that has been used in 
Safety Weighted Hazard Index (SWeHI) by Faisal I. Khan et al. methods.  
 
SWeHI concepts is generally regarded as being more reliable and robust because 
they depend on the physical and chemical properties of the system rather that the proper 
and timely operation. However, with some additions and modifications in the 
methodology, PSCI can be determined by integrating the conflict indicator and damage 







In SWeHI framework, damage index is denoted by B, which is the quantitative 
measure of the damage that may be caused by a unit/plant. It is measured in terms of 
area under 50% probability of damage. B has two components; B1 addresses damage 
due to fire and explosion while B2 considers damage due to toxic release and dispersion. 
Thus, our main focus in this project is the damage index, DI or denoted by B2 factor in 
SWeHI framework.  
 
The parameter DI quantifies radius of the area (in meters) affected lethally by a 
toxic load at 50% probability of causing fatality. This index is similar to the toxic 
damage index of the HIRA system. This factor is derived using transport phenomena 
and empirical models based on the quantity of chemical(s) involved in the unit, the 
physical state of the chemical(s), the toxicity of the chemical(s), the operating conditions 
and the site characteristic. 
 
The dispersion is assumed to occur under slightly stable atmospheric conditions 
to represent a median of high instability and stability. Furthermore, such conditions are 
often prevalent during accidents – as happened at Bhopal, Basel and Panipat. (Khan et 
al, 2001).The estimation of DI is done with one core factor, named as the G factor, and 
several penalties. The G factor takes into account the following conditions (Khan et al, 
2001): 
a) During the accidental release of super-heated liquid from the unit, where a 
part of the liquid would flash into vapor and the remaining part would form a 
liquid pool and evaporate.  
b) The release gas would directly lead to dispersion in atmosphere and would 
cause build-up of lethal of toxic load.  
c) Liquified gases would have two-phase release, followed by dispersion and 
build up of toxic load.  
d) Pyrophilic solids would give toxic vapours 
27 
 
3.1 Damage Index 
 
In this project, the focus is narrowed down to the dispersion of toxic release in 
the quantify radius of area that is lethally by a toxic load at 50% possibility of fatalities. 
The core factor, G is also the core factor for SWeHI and it is forms the base or the ‘core 
weight’ that provides to the several of penalties. The systematic procedure to quantify 
the damage index, DI is presented in Figure 3.  
Core factor, G = S × m 
The value of S is dependent on the release conditions which can be arrived to a 
value by using Table 5 and m is denoted as anticipated release rate, kgs-1. 
 
Table 5: Guidelines to assign the value to the factor S 
NFPA Rank Liquid Liquefied gas Gas Solid 
4 4.0 8.0 13.4 0.1300 
3 0.40 0.80 1.34 0.0130 
2 0.20 0.40 0.67 0.0060 




























Figure 1: Estimating Damage Index, DI 
 
Several penalties have been taken into account such as operating temperature, 
operating pressure, inventory and the toxicity of chemicals. The effects of temperature 
and pressure are estimated through pnr1 and pnr2 respectively and these are the 
derivations of TCPA, OSHA and several authors (Khan et al., 2001).  
START 
Take a process unit and identify all 




Calculate G factor, G = S × m 
Calculate penalties  
Temperature, Pressure, Volume, Toxicity  
 






The conditions of estimating those penalties are as follows: 
Temperature 
if (chemical is flammable) 
 if (fire point > temperature > flash point) 
 pnr1 = 1.45 
 if (0.75 auto ignition temperature > temperature > fire point) 
 pnr1 = 1.75 
 if (temperature > 0.75 auto ignition temperature) 
 pnr1 = 1.95 
or if (chemical is toxic or corrosive) 
 if (temperature > 4 x ambient temperature) 
 pnr1 = 1.55 
or if (temperature > 2 x ambient temperature) 
 pnr1 = 1.35 




 if (PP > 3.0 > AP) 
 pnr2 = h1(PP) 
or pnr2 = 1.3 
or  if(PP < VP) 
 pnr2 = -h2(PP) where PP <0.3 x AP 
Otherwise 





Figure 2: Penalty due to severity of pressure (above atmospheric pressure) 
 















Storage tank Unit involve physical changes 
The effect due to the quantity of the 
chemical handled in the unit (capacity of 
the unit)  
 
Pnr3=fqur(quantity in tons) 
 
Penalty due to quantity of chemical 
handled 
in storage unit 
It is similar to the one for storage units 
except that a more pronounced impact has 
been taken into account.  
 
Pnr3=fqur(quantity in tons) 
 
Penalty due to quantity of chemical 
handled 




Due to the toxicity of a chemical is access NFPA-49 health factor (NH) as 
  
Pnr4 = Maximum (1, 0.6 x NH) 
 
Finally, the G factor and the penalties are combined to give damage index, B2 using the 
following equation: 
𝐵2 = 𝑎(𝐺 × 𝑝𝑛𝑟1 × 𝑝𝑛𝑟2 × 𝑝𝑛𝑟3 × 𝑝𝑛𝑟4 × 𝑝𝑛𝑟5)𝑏  
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Where a and b are constant and are estimated empirically by studying release 
and dispersion of a range of chemicals. Those appropriate values of a and b are 
estimated as: 
𝑎 = 25.35 
𝑏 = 0.425 
Damage index is then generated by generalizing B2 to a fix value line. 
 
 























































Calculate the Damage Index (DI) of a case study 
Acceptable DI? 
Generate the design options for the selected process unit 
based on Inherent Safety Principles (ISP) 
Calculate the Conflict Index (CI) from process alternatives. 
 
Assign score index by using conflicts indicator.   
Integrate DI with CI and generate the Process Safety Conflict 
Index (PSCI). 
Rank the alternatives routes with respect to PSCI. 
END 
Consider one process unit as a case study and 
identify the process involved and operating 
conditions 
Identify chemicals and collect physiochemical 
characteristic 
Identify types of hazards 
Toxic? 
    YES 
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3.2 Conflicts Indicator 
 
The conceptual framework of the PSCI is shown in Figure 6. This framework 
comprised two main sub-indices; a damage index, DI and the conflict index, CI. The 
damage index has been calculated at the very first part of the framework. The step-by-
step methodology of calculating damage index (DI) has been shown in Figure 5.  
Conflict index, CI has been developed in taken into accounts the likelihood of conflicts 
that arise in the design options after considering the inherent safety principles (ISP). It is 
a measurement of the impact of the ISP analysis to the safety process. The conflict 
indicator has been developed and shown in Table 5.  
Table 6: Conflict Indicator 
Score Reactant Temp. Op. 
Pressure 
Inventory NF NR 
1 T < Tf Tb  > 90 ˚C P < 1 atm m  <  mc 0 , 1 0 , 1 
2 Tfire > T > Tf Tb = 60˚C 
– 89˚C 
P = 1 atm – 
35 bar 
m = 2 – 3  mc 2 2 
3 0.75 Tauto > 
T > Tfire 
Tb = 38˚C 
– 59˚C 
P = 3501 kPa 
– 200bar 
m = 4 – 6 mc 3 3 
4 T  > 0.75 
Tauto 
Tb  < 38 ˚C P > 200 bar m  >  7 mc 4 4 
 
The conflict studies are then being evaluated by calculating the penalties. The 
penalties that have been taken into account are as in the conflict indicator table. Scores 
are assigned to each of the reactants in the process including case study and process 






∑ CT (Temperature) = Score of conflict indicator for temperature of a reactants in a 
process unit  
∑ CP (Pressure) = Score of conflict indicator for pressure of a reactant reactants in 
a process unit  
∑ CF (Flammability) = Score of conflict indicator for flammability of a reactant 
reactants in a process unit  
∑ CR (Reactivity) = Score of conflict indicator for reactivity of a reactant reactants 
in a process unit  
∑ CIV (Inventory) = Score of conflict indicator for inventory of a reactant reactants 
in a process unit  
Thus,  
𝑪𝟐 = 𝑪𝑻+ 𝑪𝑷+ 𝑪𝑭+ 𝑪𝑹+  𝑪𝑰𝑽   
 
 
Conflict Index (CI) is then generated by generalizing C2 to a fix value line. 
 































AltA/1 CT1 CP1 CF1 CR1 CIV1 
  
AltA/2 CT2 CP2 CF2 CR2 CIV2 
AltA/3 CT3 CP3 CF3 CR3 CIV3 
AltA/4 CT4 CP4 CF4 CR4 CIV4 
Total Alt A ∑ CT ∑ CP ∑ CF ∑ CR ∑ CIV 
 
3.2.1 Choosing indicators 
 
Temperature and pressure are the dominant parameter in a reaction. Extreme 
temperature and pressure will lead to runaway reaction that may cause toxic hazards 
release to the environment.  As temperature of the chemical is increases, the 
flammability range will also increase as well.   High pressure also significantly gives 
impact to the flammability limit. Upper Flammability Limit of certain chemicals 
increase as pressure is increased. This will broaden the flammability range as well.  
 
High capacity equipment will give impact to safety. The capacity range is 
depends on the type of equipment that is used in the certain reaction. High volume of 
chemicals in process unit will release an anticipated amount of mass release to the 
environment. Not only those, the reactivity and the flammability of the chemicals also 
play important roles in prediction of damage and conflict index. For example, the high 
flammability chemical has low flammability point. The low flammability point means 
that they are easy to ignite even in room temperature. On the other hand, high reactivity 
chemical will lead a rapid reaction. This type of reaction will lead to increase 




Thus, despite of all the importance of these four main parameters, they are been 
used in predicting Conflict Index (CI) which play important roles in Process Safety 
Conflict Index (PSCI).  
 
3.3 PSCI Index Table 
 
PSCI Index Table is generated to calculate the safety index of the process by 
integrated the damage index and the conflict index. PSCI Index is denoted as a 
multiplication of conflict index and damage index of the process route.  
 
PSCI = Damage Index (DI) × Conflict Index (CI) 
 
Conflict studies end by rank the design options based on PSCI Index that has 
been calculated. Small value of PSCI Index indicates that the safer design options. Thus, 
PSCI will rank the design option as 1 and otherwise.  
 
3.4 Case Study Selection 
 
There are three (3) options of a case study that has been considered to suit this 
proposed tools. Narrowing down the focus to toxic release, author has come to three 






3.4.1 Option 1: Ammonia production process 
 
Ammonia is easily recognized by its pungent, penetrating, suffocating odor. Its 
common forms are anhydrous ammonia (without water) and ammonium hydroxide or 
aqua ammonia (a solution of ammonia and water). At standard conditions, atmospheric 
pressure and 32F, ammonia is a light gas. Exposure to ammonia vapors or liquid has 
potential for serious injury or fatality. Thus, ammonia is also categorized as a hazardous 







3.4.2 Option 2: Methyl methacrylate (MMA) process 
 
The main reaction of producing Methyl Methacrylate or MMA is by using 
acetone cyanohydrins (ACH), which is classified as an extremely hazardous substance. 
The principal hazards of ACH arise from its ready decomposition on contact with water, 
which releases highly toxic cyanide. Hydrogen cyanide is commonly listed amongst 
chemical warfare agents that cause general poisoning and skin blisters. Under the name 
prussic acid, HCN has been used as a killing agent in whaling harpoons. Hydrogen 
cyanide gas in air is explosive at concentrations over 5.6%, equivalent to 56000 ppm. 
 
 
NFPA Rating for Ammonia 
Health  = 3 
Fires  = 1  










Option 3: Polycarbonate production process 
 
One of the main reactant in producing polycarbonate is phosgene. Phosgene is an 
insidious poison as the odor may not be noticed and symptoms may be slow to appear.  
Phosgene can be detected at 0.4 ppm, which is four times the Threshold Limit Value. Its 
high toxicity arises by the action of the phosgene on the proteins in the pulmonary 
alveoli, which are the site of gas exchange: their damage disrupts the blood-air barrier 
causing suffocation. Phosgene detection badges are worn by those at risk of exposure. 









NFPA Rating for Phosgene 
Health  = 4 
Fires  = 0  
Reactivity  = 1 
 
NFPA Rating for Hydrogen Cyanide 
(HCN) 
Health  = 4 
Fires  = 4  
Reactivity  = 1 
 
NFPA Rating for Acetone cyanohydrin 
(ACH) 
Health  = 4 
Fires  = 1  





4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
After several analyses, Option 2 (As per discuss in Chapter 2) has been selected 
as the case study due to its practicality to the project. The toxicity of the hydrogen 
cyanide (HCN) in the production of MMA is noted as the very hazardous chemicals. A 
complete study of this case study is conducted to demonstrate the efficacy of the 
proposed conflict studies.  
 
4.1 Production of Methyl Methacrylate (MMA) 
 
Methyl methacrylate is an important monomer which is widely used in 
producing acrylic plastic or producing polymer dispersions for paints and coating. The 
world production capacity has been almost doubled in the past 15years and reached 
about 2.2 million tons per year. The demand of MMA is still expected steady growth in 
the future. Most manufacturers in the world today adopted the commercialized method 
of producing MMA in 1937 by the acetone cyanohydrins (ACH) process.  
 
4.2 ACH process routes details 
 
The main reaction of producing Methyl Methacrylate or MMA is by using 
acetone cyanohydrins (ACH), which is classified as an extremely hazardous substance. 
The principal hazards of ACH arise from its ready decomposition on contact with water, 
which releases highly toxic cyanide. Hydrogen cyanide is commonly listed amongst 
chemical warfare agents that cause general poisoning and skin blisters. Under the name 
prussic acid, HCN has been used as a killing agent in whaling harpoons. Hydrogen 
cyanide gas in air is explosive at concentrations over 5.6%, equivalent to 56000 ppm. 
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ACH Acetone cyanohydrin (ACH) 
1 




Gas 1200 3.4 64 -3757 
2 Aceton, HCN ACH Liquid 29 - 38 1 91 -458 
3 

































1 99.7 -1229 
 
 
Despite of using high toxicity level of reactants such as hydrogen cyanide and 
acetone cyanohydrins, this method is operated at high temperature (up to 1200˚C) and 
this may lead to run away reactions. This high toxicity profile of ACH process route 
makes this route as the best and viable case study for implement Process Safety Conflict 







4.3 Process Alternatives of Producing MMA 
 
Although the ACH method was the only industrial process until 1982 for 
manufacturing MMA, there are problems of shortage of toxic hydrogen cyanide (HCN) 
supply and of dealing with the large quantities of ammonium bisulfate waste. Till today, 
many efforts have been continuously put into the development of placing this ACH 
process.  
New commercialized processes have been developed until now, such as: 
a) Ethylene based via propionaldehyde 
b) Ethylene based via methyl propionate 
c) Propylene based 
d) Direct oxidation process consists of catalytic, isobutylene  
e) Direct oxidation process consists of catalytic, tert-butanol (TBA) oxidation  
 
These five (5) new alternatives are accomplished by application of inherent 
safety principles (ISP) throughout the design process, from conception until completion. 
These principles help avoid or reduce hazards by using safer materials and operating 
conditions, minimizing inventory and by designing a simpler and friendlier plant. The 
reactions involved in each process route along with the information used for PCIS 
analysis are shown in Appendix A. 
 
PSCI identifies hazards that are associated with the reaction and chemicals that 
involved in the process route and ranks the available process routes. Information used 
for analysis is reaction conditions, materials involved, phase of reactions, unit process 





4.4 Index Calculation for Production of MMA 
 
4.4.1 Case Study: Acetone Cyanohydrin (ACH) Route 
 
Case study of toxic release is assumed on the hole in the tank. Damage index 
(DI) and Conflict Index (CI) are calculated by using the developed method. The PSCI 
value represents the safety performance of the process route. The PSCI value of the case 
study will be compared to the other PSCI alternatives routes value.  
 
The penalties are determined and damage index (DI) has been calculated in 
Table 9. It is found that the calculated damage index (DI) of ACH Route is rather high 
and therefore the alternative routes of production of MMA are required.  
 





pnr1 pnr2 pnr3 pnr4 B2 
ACH/1 0.437 1.55 1.30 1.05 1.80 31.4 
ACH/2 0.751 1.10 1.20 1.17 2.40 39.2 
ACH/3 2.310 1.55 1.20 1.08 2.40 70.6 
ACH/4 - - - - - 0.0 
ACH/5 0.615 1.55 1.20 1.06 1.80 35.3 
ACH/6 0.357 1.55 1.30 1.03 1.80 28.6 
Total B2 205.10 









Further considerations of conflicts that arise in the process route are determined 
by using the conflict indicator in Table 6. The Conflict Index has been determined and 
summarized in Table 10. If the evaluated Conflict Index is high, therefore it is also 
indicates the parameter that can be improved for further consideration in the process 
route.  
 
Table 10: Conflict Index (CI) of ACH Process Route 
Process 
Route 
CT CP CF CR CIV C2 
ACH/1 12 6 6 3 3 30 
ACH/2 6 2 7 4 2 21 
ACH/3 4 4 2 4 2 16 
ACH/4 5 4 5 2 2 18 
ACH/5 10 4 7 5 4 30 
ACH/6 8 2 2 2 2 16 
Total C2 131 
Conflict Index (CI) 26.20 
 
 
The inherent risk assessment is continued by integrating Damage Index and 
Conflict Index.  PSCI value for ACH Process Route is calculated in Table 11 below 
.  
Table 11: PSCI of ACH Process Route 
Damage Index (DI) 20.51 
Conflict Index (CI) 26.20 







4.4.2 Alternatives Routes 
 
The application of Conflict Index (CI) and PSCI are illustrated through the 
comparison of the case study and the other alternative routes. The DI and CI for 
individual routes options were calculated in Table 12 and Table 13 respectively.  









Ethylene via based propionaldehyde 
C2PA/1 0.416 1.35 1.20 1.22 2.40 33.8 
147.1 14.71 
C2PA/2 0.547 1.55 3.88 1.15 1.80 57.4 
C2PA/3 0.537 1.20 1.20 1.06 1.80 33.4 
C2PA/4 0.238 1.35 1.20 1.09 1.80 22.5 
Ethylene via based methyl propionate 
C2PA/1 0.320 1.35 1.20 2.36 2.40 40.1 
40.1 5.00 C2PA/2 - - - - - 0.0 
C2PA/3 - - - - - 0.0 
Propylene based 
C3/1 10.7 1.35 1.20 1.18 2.40 132.0 
240.5 24.05 
C3/1 0.351 1.35 1.20 1.18 2.40 31.0 
C3/2 0.289 1.10 1.20 1.20 1.80 23.3 
C3/3 0.467 1.55 1.20 1.08 1.80 31.7 
C3/4 0.238 1.35 1.20 1.09 1.80 22.5 
Isobutylene based 
iC4/1 - - - - - 0.0 
55.9 5.569 iC4/2 0.537 1.55 1.20 1.06 1.80 33.4 
iC4/3 0.238 1.35 1.20 1.09 1.80 22.5 
Tert-butanol (TBA) based 
TBA/1 - - - - - 0.0 
55.9 5.569 TBA/2 0.537 1.55 1.20 1.06 1.80 33.4 









Table 13: Conflict Index (CI) of alternatives routes 
Process 
Route 




Ethylene via based propionaldehyde 
C2PA/1 9 6 12 4 9 40 
112 22.40 
C2PA/2 7 6 5 3 6 27 
C2PA/3 6 4 4 2 6 22 
C2PA/4 4 4 6 3 6 23 
Ethylene via based methyl propionate 
C2PA/1 9 9 12 4 9 43 
90 18.00 C2PA/2 8 2 5 2 6 23 
C2PA/3 7 2 6 3 6 24 
Propylene based 
C3/1 7 9 10 3 6 35 
95 19.00 
C3/2 4 4 4 3 4 19 
C3/3 7 4 3 2 4 20 
C3/4 4 4 6 3 4 21 
Isobutylene based 
iC4/1 8 2 5 2 2 19 
56 11.20 iC4/2 6 4 4 2 2 18 
iC4/3 4 4 6 3 2 19 
Tert-butanol (TBA) based 
TBA/1 7 4 4 2 2 19 
56 11.20 TBA/2 6 4 4 2 2 18 












The PSCI scores of every alternatives route are given in the following table and 
the alternatives routes has been ranked with respect to the case study.  
Table 14: PSCI Scores of Every Process Routes 
Process Routes Damage Index  (DI) Conflict Index (CI) PSCI Rank 
ACH 20.51 26.20 537.36 6 
C2/PA 14.71 22.40 329.50 4 
C2/MP 5.00 18.00 90.00 3 
C3 24.05 19.00 456.95 5 
i-C4 5.57 11.20 62.37 1 
TBA 5.57 11.20 62.37 1 
 
 
4.5 The approach for evaluation of the index based methods 
 
Inherent Safety Index (ISI) by Heikilla, Prototype Index Inherent Safety (PIIS) 
by Edward and Lawrence and i-Safe by Palaniappan indices were calculated for MMA 
subprocesses by using the same consistent input that has been used in PSCI approach. 
This was necessary to allow the comparison on the same basis.  
 
The indices of subprocess and process routes have been compared with each 
other and with expert evaluations. These expert evaluations were arrange by 
Lawrence(1996). The expert jury consisted of eight experts from industry and academia 
including Prof. Kletz, Lees and Duxbury. The expert evaluated the process from three 
points of views: 
a) Major accidents 
b) Medium scale event  
c) Unplanned event that causes loss of production and a disruption to local 
population but not dangerous.  
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However, since different index methods have different scales and their direct 
comparison is not possible. Thus, at this stage, only rank comparison can be analyzed 
and the summary of the comparison is summarized in Table 15.  
 
Table 15: Comparison between PSCI indices with other indices 
Ranking  ISI PIIS i-SAFE EXPERT PSCI 
1 TBA & iC4 TBA TBA TBA TBA & iC4 
2 TBA & iC4 iC4 C2/MP iC4 TBA & iC4 
3 C2/MP C2/MP iC4 C2/MP C2/MP 
4 C2/PA & C3 C3 C3 C2/PA C2/PA 
5 C2/PA & C3 C2/PA C2/PA C3 C3 
6 ACH ACH ACH ACH ACH 
 
Conflict Index (CI) is a measure of the number of conflict that arises in the 
process route. The index considers parameters such as boiling temperature, auto-ignition 
temperature, flash temperature, fire temperature, operating pressure, inventory and also 
the flammability and reactivity rating. However, based on the ranking of the process 
routes, by using PSCI method gave quite similar ranking to Expert, although PSCI could 
not make any difference between TBA and iC4.  
 
This is because the subprocesses for both TBA/1 and iC4/1 are operated at the 
same range operating conditions. Both reactants in subprocesses have low toxicity rating 
and high flammability rating that will results in same DI and CI. However, it should be 
noticed that, the differences of the top processes TBA and iC4 is quite small in expert 






Thus, based on the index calculation, it can be concluded that TBA process route 
and iC4 process route are the inherently safer routes and ACH process route is the most 
hazardous one. The TBA and iC4 routes are a three-step process while the ACH process 
route is six-step process.  
 
Other process alternatives can also be ranked on index evaluations as shown in 
Table 15. It can be seen that the ISI evaluation is not dissimilar to expert ranking, 
although in two cases ISI gave the same index value for two processes. However, in 
PIIS evaluation, there are two differences and in i-Safe four differences to expert 
ranking. 
 
4.6 Summary of general observation of the indices 
 





Very step oriented and does not consider separation sections at all.  
Does not consider hazards at all 
Lacks of inventory evaluation 
Very straightforward and fast to use 
i-Safe Step oriented index and easy to use 
Covered reaction hazards 




Largest set of sub indices 
More factors are covered 
Process diagram is needed for the equipment index 




Step oriented  and does not consider separation 
Covered reaction hazards and inventory evaluation 
Straightforward and easy to use 
Data is available from Material Safety Data Sheet and process 
literature 
More factors are covered as it also covers the conflict that may 






Inherent safety evaluations can be made in a reasonable accuracy with the index 
method discussed. When process safety ranking is considered, ISI and PCSI gave quite 
similar ranking to experts although both ISI and PCSI could make no difference between 
two processes. Both ISI and PCSI could not differentiate between TBA and iC4 process 
routes. PCSI, however, is able to differentiate other process precisely and give similar 
ranking to experts. It has to be noted that neither the experts were very common on the 
evaluations and rankings. 
 
The inaccuracy of the indices is related to differences of their sub index structure 
and properties. In PCSI, the evaluation is oriented reaction steps even it is not 
considered the separation process. However, more factors are covered as it also covers 
the conflict that may arise in the system. Not only that, it is the simplest and easiest 
method to evaluate process routes. All data is available from Material Safety Data Sheet 
and process literature and more factors are covered as it also covers the conflict that may 
arise in the system. Despite PCSI widest range of indices, PCSI come with more 












Nevertheless, the method described has some limitations. This is a preliminary 
attempt to incorporate conflict arise in the system with the inherent safety, which has not 
yet been extensively approached by previous studies. Some aspects for development in 
future studies are as shown below: 
 
a) The conflict index that has been applied here does not explicitly include wide 
factors or parameters in the process routes. The parameters that can be include 
in the conflict analysis are the site characteristic, population, reaction type, heat 
capacities, phase change and the transportation routes. Such evaluation need to 
be included in the future 
 
 
b) Detail analysis on index scores should be evaluated. Since the different index 
method have different scales and their direct comparison is not possible. Thus, 




c) An approach called integrated cost index can be integrated in this study so that, 
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1. Reaction Routes 
Route/ 
Step 




Pressure       
(bar) 
Yield    
(%) 
∆Hr      
kJ/kg 
ACH Acetone cyanohydrin (ACH) 
1 CH4  NH2,  Oxygen hydrogen cyanide Gas 1200 3.4 64 -3757 
2 Aceton, HCN ACH Liquid 29 - 38 1 91 -458 
3 ACH,  Sulphuric acid HMPA/HMPASE Liquid 130 - 150 7 98 v.exot 
4 HMPA/HMPASE, CH3OH MMA Liquid 110 - 130 7 100 small 
5 H2SO4, NH4HSO4, O2, CH4 SO2, CO2, N2 Gas 980 - 1200 1 100 -1520 
6 Ssulphur dioxide, Oxygen Sulphur trioxide Gas 405 – 440 1 99.7 -1229 
C2/PA Ethylene based via propionaldehyde 
1 Ethylene, CO, Hydrogen Propionaldehyde Gas 100 15 90.7 -2162 
2 Propionaldehyde, CH2O  Methacrolein Liquid 160 – 185 49 98 -1070 
3 Methacrolein, Oxygen Methacrylic acid Gas 350 3.7 58 -2855 
4 Methacrylic acid, CH3OH MMA Liquid 70 – 100 6.8 – 7.5 75 653 
C2/MP Ethylene based via methyl propionate 
1 Ethylene, CO, Methanol Methyl Propionate Liquid 100 100 89 -2019 
2 Methanol,  Oxygen Methylal Gas 350 – 470 1 – 4.5 79 -1997 
3 Methyl Propionate, Methylal MMA Gas 350 low 87 483 
C3 
Propylene based 
1 Propylene,  CO, HF Isobutyryl fluoride Liquid 70 120 95 -835 
2 Isobutyryl fluoride, Water Isobutyric acid Liquid 40 – 90 10 96 exot 
3 Isobutyric acid, Oxygen Methacrylic acid Gas 320 – 354 2.5 – 3 61 -883 
4 Methacrylic acid,  Methanol MMA Liquid 70 – 100 6.8 – 7.5 75 653 
i-C4 
Isobutylene based 
1 Isobutylene, Oxygen Methacrolein Gas 395 1 – 1.5 42 -1659 
2 Methacrolein,  Oxygen Methacryllic acid Gas 350 3.7 58 -1656 
3 Methacryllic acid, Methanol MMA Liquid 70 –100 6.8 – 7.5 75 490 
  
TBA Tertiary butyl alcohol (TBA) based 
1 TBA,  Oxygen Methacrolein Gas 350 4.8 83 -1165 
2 Methacrolein, Oxygen Methacryllic acid Gas 350 3.7 58 -1656 
















ACH Acetone cyanohydrin 
1 
Methane  CH4 0.00072 13447.95158 13.44795 
Ammonia NH3 0.6096 12666.18575 12.66619 
Oxygen  O2 0.00143 6740.785728 6.740786 
2 
Acetone CH3COCH3 0.7924 7980.212478 7.980212 
Hydrogen Cyanide HCN 0.6873 17147.27121 17.14727 
3 
Acetone cyanohydrin ACH 0.932 5446.104703 5.446105 
Sulphuric acid H2SO4 1.84 2362.819845 2.36282 
4 
2-hydroxy -2methyl propionamide 
(Hexamethylphosphoramide - HMPA) 
HMPA          
(C6H18N3OP) 
1.03 2280.688997 2.280689 
Methanol CH3OH 0.7945 14466.00314 14.466 
5 
Sulphuric acid H2SO4 1.84 2362.819845 2.36282 
Oxygen  O2 0.00143 7242.042824 7.242043 
Methane  CH4 0.00072 14447.96573 14.44797 
Ammonium Sulfate  NH4HSO4 1.769 2013.251415 2.013251 
6 
Sulfur dioxide SO2 1.381 3617.629884 3.61763 
Oxygen  O2 0.00143 3621.021412 3.621021 
C2/PA Ethylene based via propionaldehyde 
1 
Ethylene  C2H4 0.001178 22031.64543 22.03165 
Carbon monoxide CO 0.00125 22063.10797 22.06311 
Hydrogen H2 0.00009 306541.4952 306.5415 
2 
Propionaldehyde C3H6O 0.7975 10640.2833 10.64028 
Formaldehyde (37%solution) CH2O 0.7428 20581.75096 20.58175 
3 
Methacrolein  C4H6O 0.847 8817.310443 8.81731 
Oxygen O2 0.00143 9656.057099 9.656057 
4 
Methacrylic acid C4H6O2 1.015 7178.557457 7.178557 
Methanol CH3OH 0.7945 19288.00419 19.288 
C2/MP Ethylene based via methyl propionate 
1 
Ethylene  C2H4 0.001178 135314.7925 135.3148 
Carbon monoxide CO 0.00125 135508.0303 135.508 
Methanol CH3OH 0.7945 118463.793 118.4638 
2 
Methanol  CH3OH 0.7945 43082.63256 43.08263 
Oxygen O2 0.00143 7189.414308 7.189414 
3 
Methyl propionate CH3CH2CO2CH3 0.9147 6047.082609 6.047083 
Methylal HCH(OCH3)2   7001.550504 7.001551 
C3 Propylene based 
1 Propylene  C3H6 0.509 11956.52887 11.95653 
56 
 
Carbon monoxide CO 0.00125 17962.53963 17.96254 
Hydrofluoric acid      25143.96477 25.14396 
2 
Isobutyryl fluoride                                           (CH3)2CHCOOF   27951.7075 27.95171 
Water H2O 0.9963 27951.7075 27.95171 
3 
Isobutyric acid C4H8O2 0.9487 5710.256895 5.710257 
Oxygen O2 0.00143 7861.417735 7.861418 
4 
Methacrylic acid C4H6O2 1.015 7178.557457 7.178557 
Methanol CH3OH 0.7945 19288.00419 19.288 
i-C4 Isobutylene based 
1 
Isobutylene  C4H8 0.5948 11013.85946 11.01386 
Oxygen O2 0.00143 19312.1142 19.31211 
2 
Methacrolein  C4H6O 0.847 8817.310443 8.81731 
Oxygen O2 0.00143 9656.057099 9.656057 
3 
Methacrylic acid C4H6O2 1.015 7178.557457 7.178557 
Methanol CH3OH 0.7945 19288.00419 19.288 
TBA Tertiary butyl alcohol (TBA) based 
1 
Tertiary butyl alcohol  (CH3)3COH 0.789 8337.663982 8.337664 
Oxygen O2 0.00143 19312.1142 19.31211 
2 
Methacrolein  C4H6O 0.847 8817.310443 8.81731 
Oxygen O2 0.00143 9656.057099 9.656057 
3 
Methacrylic acid C4H6O2 1.015 7178.557457 7.178557 















3. Vapor Pressure at selected Temperature (Perrys Handbook) 
Vapor pressure  = exp A 
    where, A = [ C1 + (C2/T) + (C3 ln T) + C4(T)^C5] 
 
   
       
       Reactants C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 Vapor Pressure  (kPa) 
Methane  39.205 -1324.4 -3.4366 3.10E-05 5 n/a 
Ammonia  90.483 -4669.7 -11.607 1.72E-02 1 850.462727 
Oxygen 51.245 -1200.2 -6.4361 2.84E-02 1 163653.2368 
Acetone 69.006 -5599.6 -7.0985 6.22E-06 2 24.54664239 
Hydrogen Cyanide  36.75 -3927.1 -2.1245 3.89E-17 6 81.1491799 
Methanol 81.768 -6876 -8.7078 7.19E-06 2 12.78584119 
Sulfur Dioxide 47.365 -4084.5 -3.6469 1.80E-17 6 334.7328247 
Ethylene 74.242 -2707.2 -9.8462 2.25E-02 1 6286.41814 
Carbon monoxide 45.698 -1076.6 -4.8814 7.57E-05 2 1072066.652 
Hydrogen           12.69 -94.896 1.1125 3.29E-04 2 2.43711E+17 
Propionaldehyde 80.581 -5896.1 -8.9301 8.22E-06 2 34.17570292 
Formaldehyde 101.51 -4917.2 -13.765 2.20E-02 1 440.3188829 
Methyl Propionate 70.717 -6439.7 -6.9845 2.01E-17 6 8.761058136 
Propylene 57.263 -3382.4 -5.7707 1.04E-05 2 1020.590093 
Water 73.649 -7258.2 -7.3037 4.17E-06 2 2.31762099 
Isobutryic acid 110.38 -10540 -12.262 1.43E-17 6 0.117458059 
Isobutylene 102.5 -5021.8 -13.88 2.03E-02 1 259.5443935 
tert-butyl alcohol (TBA) 172.31 -11590 -22.118 1.37E-05 2 4.009942502 












4. Density at selected temperature 
Density  = C1/ [C2] ^ (1 + (1- (T/C3)^C4)    
    
        
        
Reactants MW C1 C2 C3 C4 Density  (g/cm3) 
Methane  16.043 2.9214 0.28976 190.56 0.28881 n/a 
Ammonia  17.03 3.5383 0.25443 405.65 0.2888 0.60957959 
Oxygen 32 3.9143 0.28772 154.58 0.2924 n/a 
Acetone 58.08 1.2332 0.25886 508.2 0.2913 0.792421303 
Hydrogen Cyanide  27.027 1.3413 0.18589 456.65 0.28206 0.687321031 
Methanol 32.042 2.288 0.2685 512.64 0.2453 0.794488225 
Sulfur Dioxide 64.065 2.106 0.25842 430.75 0.2895 1.381091352 
Ethylene 28.054 2.0961 0.27657 282.34 0.29147 n/a 
Carbon monoxide 28.01 2.897 0.27532 132.92 0.2813 n/a 
Hydrogen           2.016 5.414 0.34893 33.19 0.2706 n/a 
Propionaldehyde 58.08 1.296 0.26439 504.4 0.29417 0.797505223 
Formaldehyde 30.026 1.9415 0.22309 408 0.28571 0.742822833 
Methyl Propionate 88.106 0.9147 0.2594 530.6 0.2774 0.914675622 
Propylene 42.081 1.4094 0.26465 365.57 0.2985 0.509032224 
Water 18.015 5.459 0.30542 647.13 0.081 0.996328258 
Isobutryic acid 88.106 0.88575 0.25736 605 0.26265 0.948700398 
Isobutylene 56.108 1.1454 0.2725 417.9 0.28186 0.594757479 













1.  Milestone for Process Safety Conflict Indicator (PCSI) for Toxic Release using Risk-
based Approach (January 2010) 
  Detail/Work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7   8 9 10 11 12 13 14 














              
  
Topic: Development of 
Safety Performance 
Indicator for Toxic 
Release using Risk-based 
Approach                             
2 
Preliminary Research 
Work                             
3 Project Work                             
  a. Literature Review                             
  b. Develop Tools                             
4 
Submission of Progress 
Report               √             
5 Seminar               √             
6 Project Work Continues                             
  
e. Get information of a 
based study                             
  f. Study of a based case                             
7 
Submission of Interim 
Report Final Draft                           √ 













2. Milestone for Process Safety Conflict Indicator (PCSI) for Toxic Release using Risk-based 







  Detail/Week 1 2 3 4 5 6   7 8 9 10 11 14 18 19 
1 
Get information of a 
case study 















              
2 Study of a case study             
 
              
3 
Submission of 
Progress Report 1 
         √   
 
              
4 
Test tool to a case 
study 
            
 
              
5 
Test tool to design 
options 
            
 
              
6 
Submission of 
Progress Report 2 
            
 
√    
 
        
7 Seminar             
 
              
8 Poster Exhibition             
 
    √         
9 
Submission of 
Dissertation      (Soft 
Bound) 
            
 
        √     
10 Oral Presentation             
 
          √   
11 
Submission of 
Dissertation      
(Hard Bound) 
            
 
            √ 
